Guest editor's introduction by Neyapti B.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=mree20
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade
ISSN: 1540-496X (Print) 1558-0938 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mree20
Guest Editor's Introduction
Bilin Neyapti
To cite this article: Bilin Neyapti (2014) Guest Editor's Introduction, Emerging Markets Finance
and Trade, 50:4, 125-127, DOI: 10.2753/REE1540-496X500407
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.2753/REE1540-496X500407
Published online: 10 Dec 2014.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 8
View Crossmark data
Emerging Markets Finance & Trade / July–August 2014, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 125–127.
© 2014 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. Permissions: www.copyright.com 




Globalization has made the world a smaller, though not a less complicated, place. Social, 
political, economic, and scientific developments diffuse across borders faster than ever, 
with immense effects notwithstanding individual countries’ idiosyncrasies. This phenom-
enon was intensified by the Great Recession that spread around the world following the 
financial crisis in the United States. The persistent effects of this recession have sparked 
mass demonstrations in many developed and developing countries, and have voiced calls 
for improved governance and income equality. The general topic of this special section 
fits in such a period of a paradigm change that was precipitated by the re-recognition that 
markets are not a panacea for all economic ills and reforming institutions of governance 
is a must for sustainable development. Institutional reforms, as with any forms of tech-
nological change, however, have costs and benefits that are not distributed evenly across 
economic agents and generations. Reforming governance to deliver equity, therefore, 
stands as a great challenge facing societies in the coming decades.
The seven papers in this special section address the interplay between institutions 
and a wide array of developmental issues, ranging from firm performance to informality, 
economic growth, and foreign direct investment (FDI). Various institutional attributes of 
fiscal, financial, and corporate policies are addressed. The collection of papers presents 
a mixture of empirical evidence based on large panel data sets as well as the individual 
county experiences of China, Taiwan, and Turkey. Extensive literature on China’s 
impressive growth helps reveal the reasons for the Chinese miracle and provides valu-
able information and possibly policy lessons for other emerging countries. It is therefore 
appropriate that this special section hosts two papers on the Chinese economy. 
When do times of increasing uncertainty call for centralized harmonization in inter-
national policy coordination?  Supranational policy harmonization via international 
institutions facing politico-economic uncertainty may alleviate coordination problems 
and the transaction costs (via, e.g., common rules, regulations, diplomatic responses, 
and demand management policies), but may in turn conflict with individual country 
circumstances. The first paper in the special section, by Baniak and Grajzl, presents a 
game-theoretic model to assess the conditions under which the benefits of supranational 
harmonization outweigh its costs. The paper’s main contribution to the literature is the 
introduction of heterogeneity, uncertainty, and asymmetric information into the analysis. 
While the authors argue that asymmetries in the size and influence of jurisdictions, com-
bined with the extent of uncertainty, affect welfare gains, they also point out the limited 
likelihood of instances for which ex ante centralized policy harmonization is justified. 
Ex ante harmonization is justified when a small jurisdiction has both greater uncertainty 
and substantial influence on the large jurisdiction, which is a is rare but not a totally 
unlikely case as the authors exemplify in the paper. This is an interesting result that also 
draws attention to the potential welfare gains from pursuing policy coordination in the 
European Union in the face of ongoing uncertainty.
The second paper is by Elgin and Oztunali, who investigate the evolution of the 
informal economy in relation to economic development and institutional quality. The 
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authors argue that the informal sector can be detrimental to development as it is associ-
ated with low productivity, inadequate access to finances, and scale economies. Using 
a dynamic general equilibrium model, they show that the informal sector starts to grow 
unless economic growth is associated with institutional reforms. This finding is similar 
in essence to the first paper in showing that economic growth needs to be accomplished 
by institutional reforms to prevent the former’s potentially harmful effects on develop-
ment. The empirical analysis utilizes a panel of 141 countries, which constitutes the 
largest data set on informal economy estimates reported in Elgin and Oztunali (2012). 
The results support the model’s postulates and are robust across different measures of 
institution quality and informality. The authors acknowledge, however, that there is room 
to further explore the mechanisms whereby growth generates informality in the absence 
of institutional development.
The third paper, by Sun and He, argues that financial deregulation has played a sig-
nificant role for FDI to generate positive effects on human capital (HC) accumulation 
in China. The evidence, based on a panel of provincial-level data, shows that the effect 
of FDI on HC can be negative below some level of financial deregulation. This sug-
gests that FDI in the absence of financial deregulation crowds out domestic investment 
and hence the demand for HC; because the study covers the period from 1981 to 1999, 
the potential effects of labor mobility are argued to be absent. In conclusion, the large 
variation in the implementation of financial deregulation has led to mixed experiences in 
Chinese provinces. For emerging economies, the lesson emerging from this study is that 
an incomplete institutional reform mix may exert potentially harmful effects.
The literature provides both favorable and unfavorable arguments regarding the 
macro economic effects of fiscal decentralization (FD). Most of the recent studies of 
China’s growth performance refer to its decentralized fiscal structure coupled with its 
centralized political system; nonetheless, the empirical evidence on the role of FD has 
been mixed. The fourth paper, by Jalil, Feridun, and Sawhney, investigates empirically 
the last three decades of the Chinese economy and reports that the relationship between 
FD and growth in China has been robust for both the short and the long run. The authors 
argue that the mixed evidence reported formerly may arise from the panel analyses that 
assume homogeneous effects of FD across the provinces. To correct for this shortcoming, 
the authors use the autoregressive distributed lag bounds tests to differentiate the effects 
of FD on the provincial level. The two other novelties utilized in the analysis are the 
principal components of different FD measures and the provincial-level capital stocks 
that are estimated by the perpetual inventory method. The paper shows that, against the 
potential drawbacks of FD that have been widely discussed in regard to the capacity 
constraints of local governments, the Chinese economy benefited from the increased 
efficiency in resource allocation that is facilitated by FD. The authors also note the posi-
tive contributions of trade openness and capital accumulation to this result. As in the 
case of the previous paper, however, the authors point at the need for the investigation 
of the political and institutional processes via which the positive relationship between 
FD and growth is achieved.
In the fifth paper, Ozkan, Balsari, and Varan investigate the series of banking-sector 
reforms in Turkey during the 2000s, which covers restructuring and rehabilitation of the 
banking sector, deposit insurance, and the revision of the banking law. The empirical 
analysis indicates that the reforms have had positive effects on bank lending, asset qual-
ity, and profitability; they have also shielded the Turkish economy against the destruc-
tive effects of the global financial crisis of 2007. Covering the period 1998–2009, the 
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authors provide support for both the agency and representation hypotheses, the first of 
which views regulation as a corporate governance mechanism to reduce moral hazard 
and the second which views it as a transfer of regulatory power to the government and 
indirectly to minority stakeholders. The empirical findings indicate that banking reforms 
in Turkey have had significant positive effects on lending and asset quality, but not bank 
profitability. The authors caution, however, about the likelihood of non-systemic crises 
due to increased competition, even though the reforms have alleviated the potential of 
systemic crises in the banking sector.
In Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded 
Human History, North et al. (2009), lay out three doorstep conditions for limited access 
societies to transit into open access societies.  These conditions are (1) the establishment 
of the rule of law among the elites, (2) the adoption of perpetually existing organizations, 
and (3) the political control of the military. Given the interwoven relationships between 
the economic and political processes, on the one hand, and the varying transitional tra-
jectories, on the other, the sixth paper by Franke and Quintyn undertakes the difficult 
task of testing the validity of these conditions. Using data on ninety-three countries, the 
authors provide a composite index to account for the various aspects of each of the three 
doorstep conditions. The main political indicator is the composite index of democracy; 
economic indicators are gross domestic product per capita and income distribution. The 
empirical evidence supports the theory and demonstrates that the first doorstep possesses 
the greatest weight. The endogeneity of the doorstep indicators to economic performance 
leads the authors to use identification through heteroskedasticity method in estimation. 
The main findings indicate that the first two doorsteps have significant positive effects on 
both democratic and economic advancement, whereas the third doorstep has a positive 
effect on income equality. All the doorsteps, in turn, are affected positively by political 
and economic indicators. 
The last paper in this section is different from the rest in its micro-focus, although the 
evidence it presents also has macroeconomic implications: institutional reforms improve 
firm efficiency via improved accountability and transparency. In this paper, Yeh, Chen, 
and Wu investigate the impact of the disclosure regime and transparency rating reforms 
on Taiwanese firms’ earning quality attributes. The empirical findings reveal support for 
the significant association between both of these reforms and earning attributes. 
I thank all the contributors to this issue, which benefited greatly from the valuable 
comments and suggestions of the referees involved. I am grateful to Ali M. Kutan, the 
editor of Emerging Markets Finance & Trade, for offering me the chance to put together 
this special section and for providing his valuable guidance and support throughout the 
process. 
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